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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael Gandenberger appeals from the district court's decision to revoke his
probation even though he did not willfully violate the terms of his probation. In fact, the
evidence demonstrates that he was trying to comply with the terms of his probation.
Mr. Gandenberger asserts that I.C.R. 33(e), which requires the district court to find a
willful violation of probation before it can revoke probation, may, and should, be applied
retroactively.

He asserts that the district court did not find he was willfully in the

presence of children without a supervisor, but merely willfully in the presence of
children, which does not prove a violation, much less a willful violation, of that term of
his probation. Alternatively, he contends that, under the old rule regarding revocation of
probation, the district court failed to consider alternative means of addressing the
violation, and so erred in revoking his probation under the old rule.
The State challenges his analysis in regard to the retroactive application of
I.C.R. 33(e) and advocates for a presumption of a willful violation in that a general
finding of willfulness is all that is necessary to prove a violation of the terms of
probation. That position is directly contrary to case law and improperly shifts the burden
of proof in such cases. Finally, the State also contends that the district court considered
alternatives to revocation, even though it did not actually have information to consider in
that regard and dismissed potential alternatives anyway.

If such discussion can be

considered "consideration" it certainly was not sufficient to meet the standard for such
consideration.
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As such, because there was no evidence supporting any finding of a willful
violation of the terms of Mr. Gandenberger's probation, this Court should reverse the
district court's erroneous decision to revoke Mr. Gandenberger's probation.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Gandenberger's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief,
but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Whether, absent any substantial and competent evidence to support a finding that
Mr. Gandenberger willfully violated the terms of his probation, the district court's
decision to revoke Mr. Gandenberger's probation was in error.
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ARGUMENT
Absent Any Substantial And Competent Evidence To Support A Finding That
Mr. Gandenberger Willfully Violated The Terms Of His Probation, The District
Court's Decision To Revoke Mr. Gandenberger's Probation Was In Error

A.

Introduction
The district court erroneously revoked Mr. Gandenberger's probation because

the violation of his probation was not willful. Based on the information he had received
from a prior probation officer, Mr. Gandenberger believed that he was complying with
the terms of his probation by being in the presence of a responsible adult (his stepfather
and others) when he was around children at a family barbeque hosted by his stepfather.
Under the new rule set forth in I.C.R. 33(e) (effective approximately six months after
the revocation of Mr. Gandenberger's probation), the district court's decision
Mr. Gandenberger's probation on that evidence was erroneous.

to revoke

Even though

I.C.R. 33(e) post-dates Mr. Gandenberger's violation, it can and should be applied
retroactively because it affects his substantial rights by altering what punishment may
be imposed for a given action. However, even under the old rule, because the district
court did not actually consider alternatives to incarceration because it did not have
sufficient evidence of available alternatives (even though it could have ordered
production of such evidence), it did not properly revoke Mr. Gandenberger's probation
upon a non-willful violation of his probation. Therefore, this Court should reverse that
erroneous decision.
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8.

The Decision To Revoke Mr. Gandenberger's Probation Without Finding A Willful
Violation Was In Error Under Either The Old Rule Or The New Rule, Which May
Be Applied Retroactively
The applicability of the retroactivity doctrine does not hinge on whether the rule in

question was promulgated as a procedural or substantive rule, as the State suggests.
Rather, it hinges on the impact of the rule - whether it affects the substantive rights
of the defendant.

For example, the United States Supreme Court stated, when it

established the current test for retroactive application of new rules, "a new rule should
be applied retroactively if it requires the observance of 'those procedures that ... are
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989)
(quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (in turn quoting Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937))) (emphasis added). Additionally, a rule may

be applied retroactively if it "implicat[es] fundamental fairness and accuracy of the
criminal proceeding."

Kribel v. State, 148 Idaho 188, 191 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing

Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007); Application of Gafford, 127 Idaho 472,

476 (1995)).

As such, because new rules may simply consist of defining new

procedures that affect the fundamental fairness of the criminal proceeding (such as
which punishments are available in given situations), the retroactivity doctrine is not
limited to only those rules established via substantive law-making authority, as the State
believes. (Resp. Br., pp.6-8.)
While the rule may be issued in terms of a new procedure, it may still be applied
retroactively where it establishes procedures that impact on the substantive rights of the
defendant (i.e., whether he can procedurally be deprived of his liberty for a certain
action). See, e.g., Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352-53 (2004) (holding that the
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rules which impact the criminality or potential punishment of an act should generally
apply retroactively); Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 139 (2009) (same). I.C.R. 33(e)
does exactly that: it procedurally limits what punishment may be applied in a given set
of circumstances: "The court shall not revoke probation unless there is an admission by
the defendant or a finding by the court, following a hearing, that the defendant willfully
violated a condition of probation." I.C.R. 33(e). Therefore, even though the rule was
promulgated as a procedural rule, see State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862, 863 (1992), it
impacts the substantial rights of defendants, specifically, their ongoing liberty. As such,
I.C.R. 33(e) should apply retroactively.

Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352-53;

Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 139; see also Teague, 489 U.S. at 307; Kribel, 148 Idaho at 191.
In this case, there was no evidence that Mr. Gandenberger willfully violated the
terms of his probation. Mr. Gandenberger was alleged to have violated Term 3 of his
probation agreement (R., p.160), which reads: "I will not initiate, maintain, or establish
contact with any person, male or female, under the age of 18 years without the

presence of an approved supervisor. The supervisor must be over the age of 21 and be
approved by both my supervising officer and therapist." (State's Exhibit 5 (emphasis
added).) The State makes two claims regarding proof of the willfulness of the violation:
that "the presumption is that the violation was willful" (Resp. Br., p.10 n.3), and a
showing that Mr. Gandenberger was willfully in contact wi.th children was sufficient.
(Resp. Br., p.12.) It is wrong on both counts.
First, there is no presumption that the violation is willful.

Willfulness is an

element that must be proved by the State: "Unless the state shows that the violation
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was 'willful,' it is fundamentally unfair for the court to revoke probation .... "1 State

v. Knutsen (hereinafter, Knutsen I), 138 Idaho 918, 923 (Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis
added); State v. Lafferty, ·125 Idaho 378, 382 (Ct. App. 1994); see State v. Rose, 144
Idaho 762, 765 (2007) ("The state bears the burden of providing satisfactory proof of a
violation."); State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 106 (2009) (quoting State v. Leach, 135
Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001 )) ("If a knowing and intentional probation violation has
been proved . ... ") (emphasis added); see also Knutsen v. State (hereinafter, Knutsen

//), 144 Idaho 433, 441-42 (Ct. App. 2007) (identifying willfulness of the violation as
a material issue in probation revocation proceedings); I.C.R. 33(e).

This precedent

reveals that the State's advocacy of a presumption of willfulness should be rejected; the
State must actually offer proof of the willful violation. Furthermore, shifting the State's
burden of proving of proving a willful violation by making it a presumption which the
defense must rebut violates the defendant's right to due process.

State v. Keaveny,

136 Idaho 31, 33 (2000); see also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979).
Therefore, it is wholly inconsistent with precedent and the Constitution for there to be a
presumption that a violation of probation terms is willful.
Second, the finding that Mr. Gandenberger was just willfully in the presence of
children does not demonstrate that he willfully violated the term of his probation which

1

Under the new rule set forth in I.C.R. 33(e), that is the end of the inquiry - no showing
of willfulness means no revocation of probation. The old rule, however, allowed for a
revocation of probation after consideration of "whether adequate alternative methods of
punishing the defendant are available." Knutsen I, 138 Idaho at 923; Lafferty, 125 Idaho
at 382. As will be discussed infra, the district court did not engage in a sufficient
consideration of such alternatives, if it engaged in any such consideration at all, and so,
even under the old rule, the district court's decision to revoke Mr. Gandenberger's
probation was in error.
7

he was alleged to have violated. That term of Mr. Gandenberger's probation reads:
"I will not initiate, maintain, or establish contact with any person, male or female, under
the age of 18 years without the presence of an approved supervisor. The supervisor
must be over the age of 21 and be approved by both my supervising officer and
therapist."

(State's Exhibit 5.)

the clause

"without

the

A plain reading of that term of probation, including

presence

of

an

approved

supervisor,"

reveals

that

Mr. Gandenberger is actually permitted to initiate, maintain, or establish contact with
children so long as he is within the presence of an approved supervisor. (See State's
Exhibit 5.)

Therefore, to violate that provision, two facts must be in evidence:

(1) Mr. Gandenberger had to willfully initiate, maintain, or establish contact with a
person under 18 years of age, and (2) Mr. Gandenberger had to do so when he was
willfully out of the presence of an approved supervisor. (See State's Exhibit 5.) The
district court's finding, which the State promotes as sufficient, only considers the first of
those two facts. (Tr., Vol.3, p.35, Ls.1-4; Resp. Br., p.12.)

Without proof that

Mr. Gandenberger was willfully out of the presence of an approved supervisor, he
cannot properly have been found to be in willful violation of that term of his probation.
Furthermore, the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Gandenberger was trying to
comply with this term of probation. This is critical because The Idaho Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals have both recognized that, where a person is making good
faith efforts to conform his actions to the requirements of the. law, punishing him (in this
case, depriving him of his liberty) for those good faith efforts, even if they are erroneous,
is unacceptable. See State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 373 (2002) (refusing to allow the
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defendant to "be subjected to criminal penalties for good faith decisions that turn out
poorly-innocent mistakes in judgment"); State v. Halbes/eben, 139 Idaho 165, 170 (Ct.
App. 2003) (same).

In this case, the only evidence in regard to whether

Mr. Gandenberger willfully ignored this term of his probation, specifically, whether he
was

willfully out

of the

presence

of an

approved

supervisor,

demonstrates

Mr. Gandenberger's attempt to conform with that term of probation. The uncontradicted
evidence demonstrates that one of Mr. Gandenberger's prior probation officers had told
him and his stepfather that this term meant, so long as a responsible adult was present,
Mr. Gandenberger could be around children and still adhere to the terms of his
probation.

(See, e.g., Tr., Vol.3, p.14, Ls.6-19.)

As such, he was relying on the

representation of a legitimate source of authority to make his decisions in this regard. 2
Furthermore, conscious efforts were made to ensure that Mr. Gandenberger would be
with responsible adults at all times during the barbeque, when he would be around the
younger members of his family. (Tr., Vol.2, p.5, Ls.6-22.)
This is different than the situation in Fife, where the fact of willful possession of
firearms alone was sufficient to demonstrate a violation of the term of probation.
State v. Fife, 114 Idaho 103, 104-05 (Ct. App. 1988).

In that case, there was no

qualifying clause in the term that would abrogate that provision if other certain
circumstances were present. (Compare State's Exhibit 5 (allowing Mr. Gandenberger to

2

Given the fact that Mr. Gandenberger suffers from paranoid schizophrenia to the point
where his stepfather is attempting to gain guardianship over him (Tr., Vol.1, p.40,
Ls.15-18; Tr., Vol.3, p.16, L.19 - p.19, L.9), and the fact that his current probation officer
was unaware of those facts, nor would he talk with Mr. Gandenberger's stepfather,
Mr. Gandenberger's efforts, relying on the assistance of his stepfather, are perfectly
reasonable attempts to conform with this term of his probation.
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initiate contact with children if he is within the presence of an approved supervisor).)
Therefore, the colloquy in Fife about the terms of probation, wherein the defendant
stated he understood the terms thereof, was sufficient to demonstrate his understanding
of the terms. See Fife, 114 Idaho at 105-06 (the term in that case was "Basically that
being a convicted felon fell under the Federal Firearms Statute which prohibited him
from having ownership, control or possession of any workable firearms or ammunition,"
which, according to the Court of Appeals, clearly meant no possession of guns
whatsoever) (emphasis from original).
However, in Mr. Gandenberger's case, the term in question was not unequivocal.
Compare Fife, 114 Idaho at 105. The description of the supervisor in the term is "over
the age of 21 and be approved by both my supervising officer and therapist." (State's
Exhibit 5.) That means, by the nature of the term itself, the term was fluid, subject to
change at the whim of the supervising officer or the therapist. (See State's Exhibit 5.)
According to the evidence, Mr. Gandenberger's prior probation officer essentially said
that a responsible adult was an approved supervisor. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.3, p.14, Ls.619.) Based on that information, Mr. Gandenberger believed, though erroneously, that

he was complying with the terms of his probation. 3 Comparft Fife, 114 Idaho at 105-06
(wherein a clear, unqualified statement of the terms of probation left no room for the

3

As Mr. Gandenberger's current probation officer was unaware of Mr. Gandenberger's
significant mental health issues and would not talk to the person trying to establish
guardianship over Mr. Gandenberger, it is unlikely that the current probation officer
would have known of that advice or would have clarified the meaning of this term.
(See Tr., Vol.3, p.7, Ls.6-9; Tr., Vol.3, p.13, Ls.7-9; Tr., Vol.2, p.42, L.22 - p.43, L.13.)
It also seems axiomatic that Mr. Gandenberger's stepfather, who was trying to establish
a guardianship over Mr. Gandenberger, should have been considered an approved
supervisor.
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misunderstanding asserted by that defendant). As such, his efforts, reasonably based
on information given to him by a probation officer, should not have been the basis for
revocation of his probation. I.C.R. 33(e); see Young, 138 Idaho at 373; Knutsen I, 138
Idaho at 923; Halbesleben, 139 Idaho at 170; Lafferty, 125 Idaho at 382.
Finally, the facts of this case demonstrate that Mr. Gandenberger could have
been returned to probation, with a proper understanding of the term of probation and
been successful, and thus, revocation was erroneous under the old rule regarding proof
of a willful violation. (Tr., Vol.3, p.17, Ls.5-19 (Mr. Gandenberger's stepfather testifying
that he was able to be supervise Mr. Gandenberger every day and would help him
comply with the terms of his probation, as they had been clarified).) That is a significant
alternative that needed to be considered because, according to his primary mental
health care provider, "[t]he placement in an unfamiliar, sometimes chaotic environment
[like prison] is likely to exacerbate an already fragile mental status." (2010 Peppersack
letter attached to PSI.)

The health care provider continues to advise that prison is

inappropriate for Mr. Gandenberger, and that he should be placed in a community
setting, such as an assisted living or certified family home.

(Defendant's Exhibit A.)

Prison would only serve to undermine Mr. Gandenberger's rehabilitation. 4 (Defendant's

The district court, in considering whether probation is appropriate, must determine
"whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continuation of
the probation is consistent with the protection of society." State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho
308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000). There are criteria which have been established to guide that
determination. State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998) (citing I.C. § 19-2521); see
also State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993) (governing criteria, or sentencing
objectives, to be considered in this regard are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence
of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and
(4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing).
According to the person treating
Mr. Gandenberger, sending him to prison would destabilize him, which means prison
would not serve the goal of rehabilitation and would ultimately undermine the protection
4
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Exhibit A; 2010 Peppersack letter attached to PSI.) That alternative, as well as the
alternatives of assisted living facilities, were dismissed without investigation or sufficient
consideration by the district court. (See Tr., Vol.3, p.37, Ls.17-20.)
As to the alternative of an assisted living program, the district court could have
ordered production of information in that regard so that it could adequately consider that
alternative. See Lafferty, 125 Idaho at 382-83 (wherein the district court, after finding a
violation of the terms of probation, allowed the defendant. a period of thirty days to
locate a new facility in which to live in the community, and after the defendant presented
evidence of such alternatives, the district court was able to properly decide how to
proceed with the disposition of the probation violation).
consider information which it did not have. 5

The district court could not

As such, it failed to consider the

alternatives to incarceration, which would have better served the goals of sentencing.
Cf State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 106 (2009) (where the district court had specific

information about alternative facilities in which to place the defendant, and after
considering that specific information, determined they were not acceptable). Therefore,
even under the old rule, which required consideration of such alternatives when the

afforded society (as that result would be likely to destabilize Mr. Gandenberger then
release him back into the community in that destabilized state). As such, the decision to
revoke Mr. Gandenberger's probation was an abuse of discretion. See Merwin, 131
Idaho at 648; Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500.
5 There seems to be no tactical reason for defense counsel to have not presented such
information at the disposition hearing. As a result, defense counsel may have been
ineffective. That does not, however, deprive the district court of the ability to request
submission of such information so that it could actually consider alternatives to
incarceration. Compare Lafferrty, 125 Idaho at 382-83. As such, the district court failed
to meet its obligations under the old rule when a non-willful violation of probation
occurred. See id. Therefore, the decision to revoke Mr. Gandenberger's probation was
·
erroneous. See, e.g., Knutsen I, 138 Idaho at 923.
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violation was not willful, the district court's decision to revoke Mr. Gandenberger's
probation was erroneous.
Because evidence was not presented to show that Mr. Gandenberger was
willfully out of the presence of an approved supervisor (the only evidence on that point
indicates that Mr. Gandenberger believed he was complying with that term of
probation), there is no evidence that he willfully violated Term 3 of his probation. As
such, under the new version of I.C.R. 33(e), which may, and should, apply retroactively
because of the impact it has on defendants' substantive rights, the decision to revoke
Mr. Gandenberger's probation was in error. However, even under the old rule, because
the district court did not actually consider alternatives to incarceration, as it did not have
evidence of alternatives, even though it could have ordered production of evidence in
that regard, the district court's decision to revoke Mr. Gandenberger's probation was in
error.

CONCLUSION
Because the district court's decision was based on a clearly erroneous
determination that he had willfully violated the terms of his probation, Mr. Gandenberger
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order revoking his probation and
remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 4th day of April, 2013.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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